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ACCEPTANCE REMARKS
BANKRUPTCY'S UNDISCOVERED COUNTRY
Douglas G. Baird*
Tonight I shall talk about bankruptcy's past and its future. In doing this, I
want to reconcile insights from two of our country's greatest philosophers.
First, remember what Harry Truman told us:
The only thing new in the world is the history you don't know.
But there is also Yogi Berra:
The future ain't what it used to be?
To meet the challenges of the future, we must always look to the lessons of
the past. The genius of our bankruptcy law lies in its ability to adapt itself to
changing circumstances while respecting its two core principles: The fresh
start for the honest but unfortunate individual debtor, and a second chance for a
financially troubled, but fundamentally sound company to make it in the
marketplace. To make sure we continue to do this, we must confront squarely
an enormous challenge: The dramatic innovations in finance in recent years.
Individuals and corporations today can access capital in ways scarcely
imaginable only a few years ago. When I was young, if you wanted credit, you
had to put on a suit, go to your local bank, and fill out paperwork in front of an
officious bank officer. Today, almost anyone can float securitized debt on
global capital markets. Indeed, you can enter this market even if all you want
to do is cover the purchase of a single cup of coffee at Starbucks. Just use a
credit card. The financial revolution that has made this and much more

Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. These
remarks were given at the Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal annual banquet on March 27. 2008. I am
grateful to the students of the Journal and most especially to Morris Maeey who gave me a warm and gracious
introduction. Morris has long been one of the great leaders of our profession and an exemplar of a person who
has lived long and well in the law.
'

MERLE MILLER, PLAIN SPEAKING: A N ORAL BIOGRAPHY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN 26 ( 1974).

^ See Yogi Berra Official Web Site, http://www.yogiberra.com/yogi-isms.html (last visited Oct. 4,
2008).
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possible is, over the long term, likely a good thing, but our job as bankruptcy
lawyers will be in treating the casualties of this revolution, and there are going
to be a lot of them.
I.

CONSUMER DEBT, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE AMERICAN DREAM

Let us start with consumer bankruptcies.'' The number of bankruptcy cases
doubled during the 1990s, but this is part of a much longer trend. The number
of consumer bankruptcies also tripled in the 1950s, almost doubled in the
1960s, and tripled again during the 1980s. Only in the 1970s, a period marked
by double-digit inflation, did the rate remain relatively flat. There is a simple
explanation for this change: People are borrowing more—much more. The
level of consumer debt has increased almost continuously from 1945, when it
stood at $5.7 billion, until the present day, when it approaches $2 trillion.
Default and bankruptcy are the inevitable consequences of borrowing.
Holding everything else constant, as consumers borrow more, defaults
increase, and bankruptcy fllings rise. To state the obvious, we have more
bankruptcies today because we have more debt. If there are no cars, there are
no car accidents. If there is no debt, there is no bankruptcy. You increase the
number of cars, and you get more accidents. You increase the amount of debt,
and you get more bankruptcy.
A single engine is driving much of the change—and this returns me to my
principal theme for the evening. Over the past sixty years, financial innovation
has continuously transformed the consumer lending industry. It has become
easier to borrow.
You lower the costs of borrowing, and people borrow more. This is a basic
principle of econornics: You make something cheaper, and demand for it
increases. CDOs and all the exotic stuff you read about in the Wall Street
Journal were dreamt up by a handful of investment bankers over Chinese
food.^ They are merely the latest innovations that make consumer credit ever
more available.

' This part of the paper draws on observations I made in Douglas G. Baird, Technology,
and Bankruptcy, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 305.
"• See

Information,

LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CONSUMER

CREDIT 291 (1999).
^ See Mark Pittman, Subprime Securities Market Began as 'Group of 5' Over Chinese, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Dec. 17, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aA6YCIxKUoek.
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When people point to the huge rise in consumer debt as a cause for
concern, their focus is usually on borrowing against future earnings to finance
present consumption. Borrowing against future earnings to pay for present
consumption on a large scale is a relatively recent phenomenon. My parents'
generation, brought up during the Depression, would never dream of such a
thing. In 1970, fewer than one in five American households had a credit card;
now almost three households in four do. In 1970, credit card debt representecj
four percent of consumer borrowing; by 2002, it was forty-two percent.^
American households today hold untapped credit lines vvorth more than $4
trillion.^
Technology allows credit decisions to be made automatically with respect
to ever smaller transactions. For many individuals—indeed now for the vast
majority—the decision to smooth consumption is entirely a matter of personal
choice. The markets have become incredibly liquid. Worry especially about
overuse of this type of debt brought us BAPCPA. Such borrowing, however,
is not necessarily bad.
Many of you have almost no current income but can anticipate, with
considerable confidence, substantial future earnings. You will maximize your
happiness over the course of your lives by consuming today against future
income. You will make lots of money when you are fifty, but let's face it: By
the time you are fifty, your life is over. The hormones are gone; you don't
have fun anymore. Pizza and beer taste better at twenty-five than it ever will
again. And so too for life's other pleasures. Borrow today from the person
you will be when you are fifty. You might as well enjoy yourself now before it
is too late.
But focusing on consumer debt distracts us from a bigger issue. Home
mortgages represent more than seventy percent of all household debt. Living
in one's own home is an integral part of the American Drearri, and promoting
home ownership has been for many years a widely lauded govemment policy.
Home ownership, however, brings debt with it as surely as night follows day.
In 1940, about forty-four percent of households owned their homes. In 2000,
about sixty-six percent did. Moreover, the value of the houses has quadrupled

*

See WENDY EDELBERG, RISK-BASED PRICING OF INTEREST RATES IN HOUSEHOLD LOAN MARKETS 5

(Dec. 5, 2003), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/200362/200362pap.pdf.
' DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE. PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN
BUYING AND BORROWING 89 (2d ed. 2005).
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since 1940.^ Another way to see the increasing importance of home ownership
is to look at total mortgage debt relative to total household income. It was
twenty percent of household income in 1950, forty-six percent in 1980, and
seventy-three percent in 2001.' And the increase in home ownership—and
with it the increase in borrowing to buy homes—has come from those with the
highest credit risks.
In the press recently, it has been reported that there is a high level of fraud
associated with subprime borrowing.'" But this should not come as a surprise.
History teaches that every time there is a new technology, opportunities open
for the unscrupulous, and fraud will follow." We have seen this in bankruptcy
before, and we shall see it again. But fraud is not the main event. It is the
collapse in housing prices.
We must confront the following hard reality: New technology brought on a
dramatic increase in borrowing by individuals who thought housing prices
would not fall. The problem, as my colleague Richard Thaler reminds us, is
that life is not like Groundhog Day. Unlike Bill Murray, we do not get the
chance to live the same day (February 2nd) over and over until we finally learn
enough to make all our choices perfectly. We do not have the chance to
experiment with our own lives. Many important decisions—such as buying a
house—are ones we do only a few times in our entire lives. We do not have
rehearsals, and, for the most part, we do not l^ave do-overs.'^
We must rely on the experience of others, but this does not help us much
when we confront a new market, one in which there are lending opportunities
no one has seen before—adjustable rate, low down payment, no doc loans.
Experience matters, and this is a place where no one has had enough of it. The
" See Brian K. Bucks, Arthur B. Kennickell & Kevin B. Moore, Recent Changes in U.S. Family
Finances: Fvidence from ihe 2001 and 2004 Siiirey of Consumer Finances, FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN
A32. Table 12 (2006). http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/financesurvey.pdf.
' See Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wächter, The American Mortgage in Historical and International
Context, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 93 (Fall 2005).
'" See. e.g.. Christopher S. Rubaber, Cases of Mortgage Fraud Up. FBI Says: Bureau Makes Issue a
Priority, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2007, at D4.
" See. e.g.. Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924) (Charles Ponzi defrauds thousands using bogus
postal reply coupons.).
'^ Indeed, as Edward Morrison and I have argued elsewhere, what little evidence exists suggests that the
level of fraud in bankruptcy has been declining. See Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrision, Adversary
Proceedings: A Sideshow, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 951 (2006) (challenges to discharge fell from about four
percent during the early 1990s to about 1.5 percent in 2002).
'•^ See Richard H. Thaler, From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 135-36
(2000).
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decline in housing prices we have seen in the last year is not something we
have seen in decades. And even if you knew what happened in the past, you
might be misled. There were many disadvantages to the old world, the one in
which the mortgage sat in the bank that lent the money in the first place, but it
was a simpler world. The relevant documentation was in one place, and if you
wanted to restructure the debt, you knew who you had to bargain with. In the
new world in which the debt itself is commoditized, the documentation could
be anywhere. Foreclosing and proving up your claim is no longer going to be
so easy. Moreover, working out a sensible restructuring may no longer be
possible if the mortgage has been folded and repackaged multiple times. The
costs associated with this restructuring may be a sound rationale for some of
the reforms now in Congress. These would make it possible to strip-down
home mortgage debt in Chapter 13 like other kinds of debt.'"*
Let us summarize then these observations about financial innovation and
what it means for consumer bankruptcy. Home ownership has increased in
large part because of financial innovation. The trajectory of change strongly
suggests that the next round of consumer bankruptcies may be the worst since
the Great Depression, but not because of irresponsible consumer borrowing. In
the coming round of bankruptcies, we are going to have hardworking people
whose only sin was to try to live the American Dream. Dealing with these
honest, but unfortunate debtors will be one of the biggest challenges our
consumer bankruptcy law has ever faced.
II.

CHAPTER 11 ' S NEW CHALLENGE

The same financial innovations that we have been discussing in the context
of consumer bankruptcies will produce a new wave of challenges for business
bankruptcies as well. We have allowed ordinary commercial loans to be sliced
and diced and repackaged too. Defaults on these loans remain at record lows,
but sooner or later, there will be a day of reckoning. Bankruptcy again can
make the best of a bad situation. To get some purchase on this question, it is
again useful to look at history.
Every account of Chapter 11 begins with railroads. The law of corporate
reorganizations evolved out of the old equity receiverships used to reorganize
''' For an analysis of this idea, see Adam Levitin & Joshua Goodman, The Ejfecl of Bankruptcy StripDown on Mortgage Markets, (Georgetown Law & Econ. Res., Paper No. 1087816. February 6, 2008).
available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract=10878l6.
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nineteenth-century railroads. Railroads like the Atchinson Topeka & Santa Fe
turned an operating profit, but could not hope to recoup their construction
costs, costs that ran into the hundreds of millions of dollars back when a
hundred million dollars was real money. Their assets were being put to their
highest and best use. Indeed, the iron rails and wooden ties connecting two
cities had no use other than as a railroad.
There were but limited options for dealing with financially distressed
railroads in the nineteenth century.'^ The prospect of a piecemeal sale—first
left hand rails and then the right hand ones^was enormously destructive. But
a cash sale of the whole business was simply out of the question. No single
individual or group of individuals could amass sufficient capital. The law of
corporate reorganizations came into being as a result. Lawyers and the
investment bankers who sold the bonds in the first instance created it by
extending the existing legal device of an equity receivership. Modem Chapter
11—with its automatic stay and its plans of reorganization and its absolute
priority rule—derives its essential features from the equity receivership. But
do we still have railroads? Perhaps not.
First, we need to worry less about destroying value through a piecemeal
liquidation. In a service-oriented economy, the assets walk out the door at five
o'clock. These businesses are fundamentally different from railroads. You
can assemble and disassemble and outsource more easily. And I'm not just
talking about sweaters and children's pajamas. Boeing's new 787 Dreamliner
is being assembled in Seattle, but its components are being made elsewhere.
Indeed, a third is from Japan.'^ New model Chevys have engines made in
China."
In addition, we now have many more winner-take-all markets. At work is
something called the gazelle principle. You have a herd of beautiful gazelles
that run across the African plain. Lions are their only enemy. Scientists have a
special term for the really fast gazelle that is just a little bit slower than the
others: Dinner! Today, a business venture may be unable to cover its expenses
if the market provides an alternative way to make the same goods just a little
bit cheaper. The businesses that fail today may be more likely to lack going-

" See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751. 758-60
(2002).
'^ See Peter Pae, Japanese Helping 787 Take Wing. L.A. TIMES, May 9. 2005. at Cl.
" Ian Austen, Under a Chevy's Hood. Some Innards from China and Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2008,
atDl.
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concern value and cannot compete in the marketplace no matter how they are
restructured.
Moreover, capital markets themselves have changed. Markets are far, far
more liquid than they once were. When things go.badly, you can have a
market sale. In the equity receivership, no actual sale of the whole business
could take place. Today, sales are part of the warp and woof of Chapter 11
practice. Indeed, the majority of large Chapter 11 cases end up as sales.'
Sometimes the whole point of filing for Chapter 11 is to use the bankruptcy
court as a way of selling their assets to the highest bidder, whether piecemeal
or as a going concern. The bankruptcy judge has become auctioneer. In many
other cases, a new owner comes into being simply by buying up the fulcrum
securities. If we take a snapshot of the business before and after Chapter 11,
we would not be able to tell whether there has been a Chapter 11 or a
traditional corporate-control transaction.
The old shareholders are gone, as are the old managers and the old board;
in addition, the business may be folded into another. New managers run a
business whose operations have been streamlined and whose workforce has
been reduced. The process itself resembles the takeover battles we see outside
of bankruptcy. Corporate raiders square off against each other in a bidding
war, just as they would in a hostile takeover. Lawyers shuttle between their
offices in New York and a courtroom in Wilmington. Chapter 11 has morphed
into a branch of the law governing mergers and acquisitions. But bankruptcy
can change in this way and still be true to its core mission. The Code was not
designed to put so much weight on § 363 going concern sales and we need to
make sure that, if it is the right thing to do, we do it, and we do it well.
The dynamics I have just talked have been what we have seen in large
Chapter 1 Is for the first half of this decade. What is financial innovation going
to do to bankruptcy over the next few years? It is hard to say. Again to quote
Yogi Berra:
It's tough to make predictions, especially about the future.^^
But let us speculate. Let us start with some of the most obvious new kids
on the block and how this is going to change things.
'* See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 675-77
(2003).
" See Famous Quotes and Quotations, http://www.famous-quotes-and-quotations.com/yogi-berra-quotes.
html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
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In 2001, second-lien loan volume was minuscule. By 2006, it was $29
10

billion. Now second liens are occupying large parts of the capital structure of
many businesses, especially in the middle market. Companies are so highly
leveraged with second liens that these cases are going to be administratively
insolvent/rom the start. The trade creditors, the workers, the retirees are all
out of the money from the get-go and everyone knows it. The Chapter 11 is
exclusively for the benefit of secured creditors. They may well pay the
workers and the trade, but only because they feel like it, only because it is in
their self-interest.
Can the first- and second-lien holders come in to the bankruptcy court and
say, "We would like you to do this reorganization for us. Don't pay any
attention to the trade or the workers or anyone else but us. We understand that
we need to fund the case to pay administration expenses and anyone else who
can make nuisances of themselves, but that is what carveouts are for." How
are bankruptcy judges going to react when you appear and tell them they have
to run a big Chapter 11 exclusively for the benefit of secured creditors?^^ If it
is any comfort, this is not the first time we have seen this. The railroad equity
receiverships were the same. The railroads were top-heavy with secured debt,
and general creditors were entitled to nothing. Again, the only thing new in
the world is the history you never learned.
There is another question I have about second liens. The intercreditor
agreement is going to defme the dynamics of the case.^^ When you have
allowed a second lien, your first is only as good as your intercreditor
agreement. We all know that second liens have gotten progressively less silent
over time. And how vigorously negotiated was your intercreditor agreement?
Let me ask the question this way. Did the same lawyer represent both the firstand second-lien holders in the deal? If so, you are depending on a deal your
lawyer negotiated with himself.

^'^ See Gary D. Chamblee, Reducing Battles Between First and Second Lien Holders Through
Intercreditor Agreements: The Role of The New ABA Model Intercreditor Agreement Task Force, 12 N.C.
BANKING INST. 1 (Mar. 2008).

^' For a discussion of carve outs, see Richard B. Levin, Almost All You Ever Wanted to Know About
Carve Out, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 445 (2002).
^2 See George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter II, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 19, 24-25 (2004) ("secured
creditors capitalizing upon agency problems to gain the help of insiders . . . the chapter 11 process and
essentially create[dj a federal unified foreclosure process").
^^ See C. Edward Dobbs, Negotiating Points in Second Lien Financing Transactions, 4 DEPAUL BUS. &
COMM. L.J. 189(2006).
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First-lien holders perhaps should not be sleeping so comfortably at night.
The problem is not even what terms of the intercreditor agreement are, but
rather how much wiggle room do they give the second lien holder. Maybe he
has consented to the dip loan or has waived the right to object to the use of
cash collateral, but is he really going to be stopped from making objections?
But there is yet another force at work that is especially scary. We are now
going to be dealing with derivatives, credit default swaps, total return swaps,
CLOs, and intricate capital structures all created by a twenty-eight-year-old
physicist with absolutely no business experience. These devices turn the
comfortable world we used to know upside down. The record owner you are
negotiating with may have engaged in swap and derivative transactions such
that, far from being long in the relevant position, he is short. You think you
and he are working together trying to solve the firm's problems, but you are
really negotiating with someone who is better off if the firm blows up.
The credit default swap market now has a notional amount over $60 trillion
dollars.^^ We can have someone who is long or short the debt in a particular
company by many times the amount of its total debt. I have been reassured by
the people who do these deals that these new fangled derivatives will not create
any problems for the bankruptcy system. They may be right. And some day
pigs mayfly.
And I haven't even begun to talk about claims trading here. Even if you
aren't on the creditors committee, you have been knee-deep in negotiations
from the get-go. You know all sorts of stuff that outsiders don't. How do you
not have inside information? How can you trade? In recent years, we have
seen the rise of so-called "Big Boy" letters. Just as the five-year-old seeking
new responsibilities attests that he is a "big boy," so too an investor can give
up any right he might have to complain that he was taken advantage of by
signing a letter to the effect that he is a big boy willing to accept whatever risks
come with nondisclosure.^*

^* See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance
and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625 (2008).
^^ For a discussion of how credit default swaps might change bankruptcy practice, see Frank Partnoy &
David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. ClN. L. REV. 1019 (2007).
^* See Daniel Sullivan, Big Boys and Chinese Walls, 75 U. CHt. L. REV. 533 (2008).
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Do the securities laws allow this? Do the securities laws even apply? And
if they don't, do bankruptcy judges have the power to regulate them?^' Where
would they get this power from? And what if you trade derivative instruments,
not claims of the firm itself? How can you violate any fiduciary duties with
respect to them? I do not know the answers to any of these questions.
CONCLUSION

In short, we are entering a brave, new world. This is the future of
bankruptcy, its undiscovered country. In entering this unknown world, we
should recall some of the most important lessons of the past. Bankruptcy law
cannot make the imprudent wise and the unlucky fortunate. Nor can it insulate
a poorly run business from the realities of the marketplace. Hence, the goals of
bankruptcy are necessarily modest. Honest but unfortunate individuals should
be given a fresh start. Corporations that have value as going concerns should
be able to acquire a new capital structure, and those that cannot survive should
be able to wrap up their affairs expeditiously. Bankruptcy law cannot work
miracles, and more harm than good comes from seeking that which cannot be
had. But if past is prologue, we can be confident that our bankruptcy system
will rise to the challenges it is facing.

^' See Robert D. Drain & Elizabeth J. Schwartz, Are Bankruptcy Claims Subject to the Federal Securities
Laws?, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 569 (Winter 2002).

